We find substantial regional variations in CMBS loan default rates based on a 10-year history of nearly 38,000 CMBS loans. We seek to explain those variations with well documented risk factors such as negative equity, insolvency, property type, originator and state foreclosure law, as well as some newly introduced factors such as local unemployment rate, loan covenant (lock out) and natural disaster (Katrina). Many of the aforementioned factors are significant for CMBS loan default risk and they help explain part of the regional variations in CMBS loan default rate. We also find a significant negative relationship between local residential real estate appreciation and CMBS loan default -those regions with higher house price appreciation rates have lower default risk in CMBS loans. Moreover, differences in MSA-level residential real estate appreciation rate add explanatory power of the regional variations in CMBS loan risk, even though they do not fully explain the regional risk. Our findings have important implications for the CMBS investment community.
Introduction
Real estate markets are localized. Investors in real properties, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), mortgage loans, and mortgage related securities (e.g., MBS, CMBS, ABS and CDOs) usually face an issue of geographic diversification. Credit rating agencies of MBS, CMBS, ABS and CDOs also must consider how to assign weights on collaterals in different regions.
Therefore, it's important to understand the regional variations in real estate and mortgage loan markets. In this paper, we study how default risk of CMBS loans varies across geographic regions and seek explanations of those regional variations.
Our analysis is based on a 10-year history of a large sample of CMBS loans in the nine US census regions (see Appendix figure 1 for the map). Our sample includes nearly 38,000 loans and it contains 1.8 million records on the monthly performance of those loans. As evidenced by figure 1, over the 1998-2007 periods, there are substantial variations in default rates across the 9 census regions 1 . East South Central and West South Central each has over 6 percent of CMBS loans in over 60-day delinquency, while the Pacific region has less than 1 percent delinquency rate. East North Central, West North Central and New England also have substantially higher default rates than Mid Atlantic and the Mountain areas.
These variations in CMBS loan default rates could be due to a number of reasons. First, different regions have experienced non-synchronized commercial real estate value appreciations (see Appendix figure 2) and existing research has found strong relationship between commercial 1 We define default as over 60-day delinquency.
mortgage default rates and collateral value appreciation/depreciation (see, e.g., Vandell et al 1993 , Ciochetti et al 2002 , and Seslen and Wheaton 2010 . Second, the regional variations in default rates could be due to different mix of collateral property types, since the existing literature has found substantial differences in default risk with property types (see, e.g., Vandell et al 1993, Ambrose and Sanders 2003 , An 2007 , and An, Deng and Gabriel 2010 . Third, Interestingly, we find many of the aforementioned factors are determinants of CMBS loan default risk and help explain the regional variations in default rates. However, even after controlling for all those factors, the regional variations remain to some degree, e.g. East South
Central and West South Central still demonstrate higher default risk while Pacific and South Atlantic show lower default risk than the rest. To seek further explanations, we link the unexplained regional risk to local residential real estate appreciation. On the one hand, the commercial property value appreciation measure we have is not at the census region level and thus the negative equity factor in our model may not fully capture the regional variations in 2 Although commercial mortgage loan underwriting standards have become more uniform as the CMBS market develops, there remain variations.
property value appreciation 3 . Therefore, the available residential real estate appreciation measure at the census region level or even MSA-level may compliment the commercial property value appreciation measure to help explain some regional variations in CMBS loan default rates given that commercial real estate market trends generally follow residential real estate trends during our study period. On the other hand, sentiments in the residential real estate market affect the commercial market. Thus we expect residential and commercial real estate markets are linked and conditions in the residential market help explain CMBS loan default. A simple plot shows that the unexplained regional risk has a negative relationship with the regional average house price appreciation rates. A martingale residual analysis further shows that house price appreciation rate helps explain the regional risk. Therefore, we include MSA-level HPI growth as an additional factor in our default risk model and find it to be significant. Moreover, some of the regional variations disappear after we include HPI growth as an explanatory variable. Finally, we notice that after all the aforementioned efforts we are still unable to explain why CMBS loans in the Pacific region, Mountain area and South Atlantic have significant lower default risk.
The existing literature on commercial mortgage default risk contains mixed evidence on the regional dimension. For example, Follain et al (1997) and Ambrose and Sanders (2003) find some regional variations in prepayment risk but not in default risk. Others such as Archer et al (2002) , Ciochetti et al (2002) , An (2007) and Yildirim (2008) find default risk variations across regions. In this paper, we find strong evidence on the significant regional variations in CMBS loan default risk based on a large representative loan sample. More importantly, we provide explanations to some of the regional variations. These evidence and explanations will help professionals to understand and predict CMBS loan default risk and thus are useful for 3 The NCREIF NPI is only down to four regions -East, Midwest, South and West.
underwriting, pricing, and risk management of CMBS loans and related securities. We also contribute to the literature by identifying a comprehensive set of commercial mortgage loan default risk factors. For example, we confirm the importance of equity position, property type, originator and state foreclosure law as risk factors. We also find local unemployment rate, loan covenant (lock out) and natural disaster (Katrina) affects loan default significantly.
We organize the paper as follows: in the next section, we explain our data and compare loan default rates across the 9 census regions; we explain our analysis using the Cox proportional hazard model in section 3; in section 4, we conclude.
Regional Variations in CMBS Loan Default Rates

Data
Our CMBS loan data is from Intex, a leading provider of historical cash flow, prepayment and default data for MBS, CMBS, ABS and CDOs at the loan-, deal-and bond-levels. Intex gathers the loan data from monthly servicing company remittance reports. Intex track each CMBS deal with loan-level collateral, and updated monthly with the latest performance information. Therefore, from the Intex database we are able to form time series observations on each CMBS loan with the status as prepaid, delinquent, foreclosed or current.
The database includes loan specific information such as LTV, NOI, original balance, current balance, actual rate (mortgage coupon rate adjusted by points), maturity term, amortization period, property type, location of underlying property, prepayment provisions, originator, and servicers (both master and special servicers). Most of that information is at loan origination or securitization. Later in the paper we explain how we construct time-varying explanatory variables.
For our study purposes, we focus on fixed-rate mortgage loan on four major property types:
multifamily, retail, office and industrial. We exclude non-MSA loans and loans from Hawaii and Alaska. We also exclude loans with interest only periods. Further, we verify loan information on rate, LTV, and original balance and exclude a few loans with invalid information on those variables. This leaves us with a final sample of 37,774 loans from 9 census regions and 49 states in US. Sample variations by region reflected in tables 2 and 3 naturally leads to the question whether the regional variations in default rate reflected in table 1 and figures 1 and 2 may be due to uneven distributions in loan property types and origination year. Table 4 reports the means of loan underwriting variables. For the whole sample, the average original loan balance is about $8.6 million, average LTV is 69%, average DSCR is 1.58, average maturity is 10 years and average amortization is about 29 years. Again, there are variations across regions. Mid Atlantic has the highest average loan balance and the highest average DSCR.
CMBS loan default rates and loan characteristics
New England has the highest average rate. Pacific has the second highest average DSCR. East South Central has the highest LTV and the lowest DSCR. Given the importance of LTV, DSCR in commercial mortgage loan default risk, these variations in underwriting variables across regions may also contribute to the observed default rate differentials reflected in table 1 and figures 1 and 2.
What Explains the Regional Variations in Default Risk? A Hazard Model Analysis
The Cox proportional hazard model
Hazard model has become the standard tool for mortgage default risk analysis. We assume the hazard rate of a CMBS loan in a certain age follows the following form:
Here   0 h T is the baseline hazard function, which only depends on the age (duration) of the loan, Let j denote the individual loan failing at j t and ( ) R t denote the set of loans at risk of default at the beginning of time t . The vector of coefficients  is estimated from a partial likelihood function:
The baseline function   0 h T is then estimated non-parametrically 7 .
Estimation of the aforementioned hazard model requires the construct of an event history of each loan, which tracks the default (current) event and corresponding risk factors in each month starting from the loan origination to loan maturity, loan default or loan censoring (data collection point), whichever is the earliest.
Covariates
We match a large number of variables, such as the term structure of interest rate, inflation, corporate credit spread, NAREIT equity REITs index, NCREIF property index, cap rates, NOI growth and vacancy rates into the dataset we constructed from Intex database. Based on this information, we construct a number of time-varying covariates to be included in our model, besides those time invariant covariates.
Negative equity: negative equity is defined as the contemporaneous property value minus the market value of the mortgage loan. We use NCREIF property index to update property values to get contemporaneous property value, and the market value of mortgage loan is calculated as the present value of remaining mortgage payments based on current market interest rate. A shortcoming of the NCREIF property index is that it is either by region or by property type but not by both. Therefore, we use the interaction of the NCREIF index by region (mixing all property types) and the NCREIF index by property type (mixing all regions) to create an index for each type of property in each region. including LTV in the calculation of negative equity, we include two dummy variables, one for original LTV less than 50% and the other one for original LTV greater than 80%.
Property type: Existing literature (see, e.g., Vandell, et al, 1993; Ciochetti, et al, 2002; Ambrose and Sanders, 2003; and An, 2007) has shown that commercial mortgage default varies systematically with collateral property type. Typically, multifamily loans are the least risky, followed by retail and office property loans. Industrial and hotel loans are viewed as the most risky of commercial property collateral. Accordingly, we control for collateral property type in our model. We also consider other local economic variables such as per capita real disposable income growth, median income growth and population growth as those factors directly affects retail sales and job growth and thus indirectly affects commercial real estate market.
Foreclosure law: Ciochetti (1997) and Archer et al (2001) argue that incidence of foreclosure can be correlated with the type of foreclosure process -whether judicial or power of sale. One hypothesis is that we can extend this reasoning to 60-day delinquency and expect a positive relationship between the strictness of state foreclosure law and default rate -knowing that it is hard for lenders to pursue a foreclosure, borrowers will more likely to choose to default when his mortgage loan is under water because it is more likely for the lender to negotiate a deal with him to avoid a costly foreclosure. On the other hand, Riddiough and Wyatt (1994) argue that lenders are more likely to be tough to distressed borrowers if he knows that borrowers may take advantage of the lenders fear of going into the costly judicial foreclosure process. That can reverse the relationship between the strictness of state foreclosure law and default rate.
Natural disaster: natural disaster like hurricane Katrina affected many commercial properties in Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida. Therefore, we include a dummy variable for those Katrina affected states.
In addition to the aforementioned covariates, we include regional dummy variables to capture variations of default risk across regions. Mid Atlantic is used as the reference group.
3.3 Duration, negative equity, property type, loan covenant, unemployment rate, foreclosure law and natural disaster Table 5 presents the sample descriptive based on our event-history data. Here each observation represents a loan in a specific month. The average duration is 69 month. Since some loans have very low LTVs and the underlying properties have experienced many times of price appreciation while at the same time there is principal payoff with amortization, the minimum value of negative equity is -608. Over 90% of the loan months are within lock out period, which is reflected in the mean of our variable "lock out". Table 6 reports the Cox Partial Likelihood estimation results of our hazard model. All continuous variables are standardized into mean of zero and standard deviation of one so that we can tell how one standard deviation shock in that variable affect the hazard rate through the hazard ratio reported in the table.
In model 1, we only include dummy variables for census regions. Mid Atlantic is used as the reference group and thus omitted from the covariates list. The model is to take control of any age (duration) effect of default risk. As we can see, after controlling for age effect default risk in the Mountain is not significantly different from default risk in Mid Atlantic region. However, Pacific region still has a significant lower risk while East South Central has over 4 times default risk than Mid Atlantic (also seen from figure 3). Figure 4 plot the estimated cumulative hazard function and its confidence interval based on model 1. As we can see, the slope of the cumulative hazard function varies with duration, which suggests that default hazard rates of CMBS loans in different ages vary.
As is evidenced in appendix figures 2 and 3, different regions experienced different commercial real estate value appreciation and NOI growth, therefore, we control for negative equity and contemporaneous DSCR in model 2. We also include log balance, original LTV dummies, property type, prepayment lock out, and volatility of 10-year Treasury rate in the model. In model 3, we further add four variables including MSA-level unemployment rate, months to complete initial action of foreclosure (a measure of the difficulty to foreclose), whether deficiency judgment is allowed and a dummy variable for Katrina affected states. As we can see from table 6, unemployment rate is a significant factor and it is positively related to CMBS loan default risk. Also, default rates in Katrina affected states are significantly higher than other states when everything else is equal. The months to complete initial action of foreclosure is negatively related to default risk, which tends to support the argument by Riddiough and Wyatt (1994) . The fitting of model 3 is slightly better than model 2, but interestingly, the regional fixed effect of East North Central goes away but South Atlantic turns to be significant in model 3. Central still show higher default risk than the rest regions.
Linking CMBS loan default to local house price appreciation
In figure 6 , we plot the aforementioned unexplained regional fixed effect of CMBS loan default risk and average house price appreciation rate in the same region. Interestingly, the graph tends to suggest a negative relationship between these two. This finding leads us to think about how price appreciation in the residential real estate market is linked to CMBS loan default.
Theoretically, there are at least two possibilities: first, the NCREIF NPI and NOI growth data are only by four regions (the East, the Midwest, the South, and the West). Therefore, the negative equity and DSCR factors we have may not fully capture the regional variations in property value appreciation and NOI growth. From this perspective, the available residential real estate appreciation measure at the census region-level or even MSA-level may compliment the commercial property value appreciation measure to explain the regional variations in CMBS loan default rates given that we observe commercial real estate market trends generally follow residential real estate trends during our study period. Second, sentiments in the residential real estate market affect the commercial real estate market, thus we expect residential real estate market conditions help explain CMBS loan default.
To seek empirical evidence, we analyze the martingale residuals from our hazard model.
Following Barlow and Prentice (1988), and Therneau et al. (1990) , the martingale residual for the i th individual is defined as We first re-estimate model 3 but exclude all the regional dummies. Then we take the martingale residual from hazard model 3 and regress it on the regional dummies, the regional average HPI growth, and MSA-level HPI growth, respectively. Figure 7 plots the unexplained regional variations in CMBS loan default risk. The plot further suggests that the unexplained hazard ratios are much closer than those in figure 5 .
Conclusions
The unprecedented housing downturn and massive default of residential mortgage loans have led to a global financial crisis. As more prudent risk management is expected for real estate and mortgage products including MBS and CMBS, it is important to understand default risk of CMBS loans as well as its determinants.
A very interesting observation in the CMBS market is that default rates of CMBS loans vary substantially across different geographic regions. It is then useful to ask whether those variations can be explained by the default risk "fundamentals" -the conventional factors suggested by existing research. Along this line, we first document the default rates of CMBS loans in 9 US census regions and show that East South Central, West South Central and East North Central have several times higher default rates than Mid Atlantic while default rate in Pacific is only half of that in Mid Atlantic. We then try to explain those variations with well documented risk factors such as negative equity, insolvency, property type, originator and state foreclosure law, as well as some newly introduced factors such as local unemployment rate, loan covenant (lock out) and natural disaster (Katrina). We find many of the aforementioned factors to be significant for CMBS loan default risk and they help explain part of the regional variations in CMBS loan default rate. Finally, we find a significant negative relationship between local residential real estate appreciation and CMBS loan default. Moreover, differences in local residential real estate appreciation rate add explanatory power of the regional risk of CMBS loans, even though they do not fully explain the regional risk.
These findings are important to the commercial mortgage and CMBS investors, as well as rating agencies and loan servicers. First, the findings confirm the importance of regional diversification in commercial mortgage investment. Stated differently, investors should price CMBS deals that have different regional concentrations differently. Second, to forecast default and CMBS cash flows, rating agencies and loan servicers need to consider regional fixed effects and need to understand which regional effects are related to default risk "fundamentals" and which ones are not. Finally, the link between residential real estate and CMBS default we find in this paper can be utilized in early warning of CMBS default as residential real estate market usually leads the commercial real estate market. Hazard ratio (adjusted) Note: *** for p<1%, ** for p<5% and * for p<5%. (%, 1998-2007) -0.018*** (0.002) MSA house price appreciation (%, from origination to current) -0.005*** (0.001) Note: *** for p<1%, ** for p<5% and * for p<5%. Note: *** for p<1%, ** for p<5% and * for p<5%. 
